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When philosophers of science try to steer a balanced middle course between naïve realism about our best scientific theories and hyper-constructivist approaches to science, they often risk making everybody unhappy. The single-minded objectivists will consider their work too dangerously close to the constructivist camp, while deniers of hardnosed facts existing independently of us will protest for the opposite reason. This book runs this risk too: while acknowledging the essential role of conventions and social exchange of information in the construction and application of physical models − thereby reasserting in a novel way Einstein’s well-known claim that physical theories are not deduced from data, but are a free creation of our minds − it sides with the objectivists in advocating the capacity of such models to represent the mind-independent world. However, it would be unfair to charge this thought-provoking book for having failed to convert the radical constructivist, because that is not its purpose. Its purpose is rather to argue that in 20th century physics culturally derived conventions and objectivity can, and ought to, coexist. 
If one of the main merits of this work is having shown that giving conventionalism its due need not entail that humanly constructed models lack objectivity, another merit is having achieved this aim by giving central stage to the concepts of symmetry and invariance, the two pillars of contemporary physics. The most innovative of all claims, in fact, is that our received faith in the equation “invariance  objectivity” − dating back at least to Klein’s 1872 Erlangen Program, and variously defended by the physicists of the Göttingen school (Weyl in particular) and by many after them, among which the late Nozick − needs to be rediscussed. 
 The first chapter deserves special attention, since by putting forward the book’s main thesis it also provides a novel account of the notion of representation. With interesting suggestions coming from the arts, we are told that a scientific representation is constituted by a triple of relations, namely (1) an Informational Relation; (2) a Relation of Isomorphism, and (3) a Representation Relation (the latter two being part of the “formal dimension” of representation) (p.25). 
The Informational Relation involves the social transmission of knowledge and material culture between persons: by encapsulating the constructive dimension of science, it makes indispensible room for the conventional side of representation. The Isomorphic Relation holds bi-directionally between an idealized conceptual model O and a mathematical model M, while the Representation Relation proper is either “the model of an original or the token of a type” (pp.16-17). Note that the “original” here is some system W belonging to the physical world. 
An example provided by the authors will help me to explain this three-partite model as well as the twofold representative function performed by the idealized model O: not only does O represent something in the physical world, but being a token of the type M, in some sense it also stands for the latter. Take X rays as entities W in the physical world: they are represented by an idealized, conceptual entity O, an electromagnetic wave, in such a way that one can claim that there exists an isomorphic relation between O and Maxwell’s equations, the mathematical model M of O (p. 21). 
The duplication of models (O and M) induces the question: why not treating O and M as parts of a single idealized mathematical structure? Part of the answer (I think) is that the isomorphic approach to the representation between models and reality has sometimes been criticized because isomorphisms can only exist between mathematical structures: since O can also be regarded as a mathematical structure (electromagnetic waves are sinusoidal functions), assuming the existence of isomorphisms or homomorphisms between O and M is perfectly legitimate. On the other hand, in another sense electromagnetic waves are not merely conceptual/mathematical entities, as according to our authors (and to most physicists) they are also mind-independent, physical entities propagating in spacetime with well-known causal powers. This is why O, besides its relation with M, also represents the physical waves W diffracted by our bones.
But while the Representation Relation between O and M is clearly spelled out (O is token of a type M, or has properties isomorphic to M), the existence of a representation relation between O and the physical world W, though clearly recognized by the authors, is left more in the dark, insofar as it raises ontological issues that they want to avoid. Of course, this choice is legitimate, but then the crucial question “why is O (together with M) capable of predicting and explaining the behaviour of the physical system W?” remains unanswered, especially if − as Debs and Redhead have it − the connection between O and W is regarded as being ultimately fixed by a social practice. By embodying the rhetorical dimension of science, the Informational Relation has in fact the essential task to connect the model O with the physical world W by providing an interpretation of O: “what makes a concrete structure, a painting or a mathematical model, a representation of any other? In response to this question, the formal approach … is … unable to provide much of an answer…” (p.11). 
However, if there were no link between W and O but that established by a social convention, objectivism would go by the board. The authors seem aware of this difficulty and provide two ways out: 
(1) Even though the formal relations are incapable of fixing the reference of O, the Information Relation is constrained by the isomorphisms existing between M and O (p. 12); 
(2) “The relation between the model [O] and the world [W] can be expressed … via the formal notion of partial isomorphism, as developed for example in the work of da Costa and French” (p.22). Despite the fact that it reintroduces (partial) isomorphisms between models and reality, this proposal is interesting, but in the book it is not discussed in its full implications (see p. 73). So the authors’ antimetaphysical stance might have its price: for example, if one could claim that entities in W, or their relations, are an instance of, or a token of O, then it would be this objective fact that explains the existence of a social rule that uses O to refer to W, and not conversely, as they argue. As an additional bonus, one could also answer the above question about the effectiveness of our mathematical models (see p. 162).
In the second chapter the idea that formal underdeterminations need to be solved by conventions is strengthened by the claim that symmetry introduces ambiguities that call for conventional choices (p. 50-1). Of particular interest in this chapter are two points: 1) structural similarities between M and O (as it was the case between M and W in the first chapter) are not sufficient to establish a representational relation between them, so that the social context of use is essential to the application of the models (p.51); 2) there are various senses in which the word “convention” is used, and the authors distinguish among trivial, absolute or relational conventions (p. 49). The first two are unconstrained: a trivial convention is, say, one that guides the choice of a name for a particle, while an absolute convention is one in which there is no-fact-of-the-matter as to, say, which simultaneity relation is picked out relatively to a reference frame (this is the sense of convention discussed in the book). The third type of convention intervenes in setting, for instance, standards of length: a ruler has a certain length only relative to a conventional choice of a standard meter. Another sense of “convention” that is not discussed in the book is given by the possibility of equating “conventional” with “constitutive a priori”: in 1905 Einstein had to stipulate some a priori conventions about simultaneity that “constituted” the theory insofar as they transformed questions that were previously meaningless into empirical questions. This sense was especially stressed in Reichenbach’s  The Theory of Relativity and a priori Knowledge (Berkeley 1965, original edition 1920). 
In the third chapter, the main theme of the book, symmetry, receives central attention. According to the authors, symmetry has three important functions in modern physics: it has heuristic power, it tracks universality, and it is a guide to objectivity. Quite remarkable is the authors’ criticism to what they name invariantism, namely the claim that symmetries are necessary and sufficient for objectivity, where “objective” is connected with both heuristic power and representational universality (p. 66 and p. 73). The problem with invariantism as defended by Weyl and Nozick is that it is merely sufficient, but not necessary to objectivity, a point that looks plausible and is defended with convincing arguments. 
Consequently, a different form of invariantism is proposed, referred to as Perspectival Invariantism, which defines objectivity in such a way that invariance becomes necessary and sufficient to it. The way to it passes through an abandonment of the identity of the elements of the idealized model O, and therefore through a form of structural realism, according to which only O’s structural and relational features are objective (p.73). Not only does this mean that such relations are preserved by the group of automorphisms of the model O, but it also implies that “objective facts” turn out to be the same from any perspective (perspectival objectivism). The decision to bracket questions of ontology comes up again also here, though by limiting their discourse to the formal approach advocated in the first chapter, the authors seem implicitly to defend a sort of epistemic structural realism (p. 73-74). 
My complaint with perspectival invariantism is that in this chapter it is not exactly clear what it entails: is it a claim about the centrality of spatiotemporal symmetries (p.72), about the objectivity of the relational structures entailed by structural realism (p. 73), or about Earman’s dictum “spacetime symmetries must be dynamical symmetries” (p. 74)? That these are different formulations of the same view, as I think it should be, is not completely clarified by the three case studies presented in the second part of the book.
The fourth chapter broaches the well-known debate about the conventionality of simultaneity in the special theory of relativity, a topic that has been an important litmus test for conventionalism since 1905. The authors begin by correctly pointing out that the sense of convention that is at stake in the debate is the one that they call absolute: is there an objective state of affairs making simultaneity claims true? Conventionalists like Reichenbach and Grünbaum replied no, but after 1977 many philosophers have answered this question in the positive, on account of Malament’s proof of the unique definability of a simultaneity relation (relative to a chosen inertial worldline) in terms of the structure of a time-symmetric Minkowski spacetime. 
Debs and Redhead claim that if one takes a perspectival invariantist approach to this debate, both positions turn out to be correct (p. 95). Pick a worldline, and then ask whether two points selected by Einstein’s standard synchrony are objectively simultaneous relative to that worldline: the answer must be in the positive. But this answer crucially depends on the decision to leave Lorentz boosts out of the full group of automorphisms of Minkowski spacetime (p.97). So conventionalism is still around for two reasons: 1) the choice of adopting a restricted set of symmetries (rather than the full set) as an invariance criterion for objectivity is in some sense conventional; 2) once that choice is made so as to include Lorentz boosts, the conventionalist seems again to be correct, because a boost will tilt the hyperplane of simultaneity orthogonal to the original worldline and will not preserve it. The conclusion is that “invariance has much to do with convention as it does with objectivity” (p.95).
The chapter is a nice illustration of the main claim of the book, but the grounds on which Debs and Redhead refuse the traditional distinction between the (uncontroversial) relativity of simultaneity and the (controversial) conventionality of simultaneity could be questioned. In their view, the relativity of simultaneity and its conventionality are really formally equivalent, since they amount to “different methods to foliate spacetime” (pp.88-94). Of course, “the choice of whether to use the line of simultaneity defined by O, O’, or any one of any infinite number of inertial worldlines” (p.87) is fully conventional, due to the relativity of simultaneity, but the debate on the conventionality of simultaneity was about the uniqueness of an value,once a given worldline had been conventionally chosen. If there were no distinction between the relativity of simultaneity and its conventionality, why claiming that Malament is correct once a worldline is chosen, while the conventionalists are correct if the full Poincaré group is given? It is of course quite possible that I missed something in their argument.
In the fifth chapter, the previous material is used to claim that those explanations of the so-called twin “paradox” relying on noninvariant structure are non-acceptable because non-objective. On the contrary, the clock hypothesis, namely the existence of “a representation relation between the elapsed time measured by a clock tc and the proper time, measured along the path of that clock” (p. 103), establishes a link between two structures that are invariant under the Poincaré group. This perspectival invariance provides the best, objective explanation of the phenomena (p. 112), despite the fact that the conventional ambiguity determined by distant clock synchrony still plays an important part in the chapter’s masterful review of previous treatments of the paradox. Such treatments can be regarded as “special cases of a more general account” (p.112), one that correctly points out that accelerations of the travelling twin have no essential role in the explanation (p.129). While the interplay between conventions and invariance is argued for successfully and originally, it is not entirely clear to me why perspectival invariantism in the twin case does not collapse into invariantism tout court.
In the final chapter on quantum theory, the most technically demanding of all, Debs and Redhead discuss the problem of localization in quantum field theory, another interesting chapter of the complex story of possible tensions between special relativity and quantum mechanics. In relativistic quantum mechanics, the problem consists in the fact that localized wave packets spread infinitely fast. In particular, Hegerfeldt’s theorem can be used to prove that if one insists on strict localizability of a single particle state, causality will be violated, meaning that the relevant localized states will not be Lorentz invariant. Since the representation relation here holds between a quantum state vector and a single localized particle, and the group of invariance is still Poincaré’s group, it turns out that the representation relation simply fails to be perspectivally invariant. 
As the authors point out, there are two ways out of this predicament; either deny that particles are fundamental and adopt fields as the basic ontological ingredient of fundamental physics − as Malament claimed in 1996 with a theorem based on algebraic quantum field theory − or argue that localization is hyperplane-dependent, a view recently proposed by Gordon Fleming. By adopting the latter option, the Newton-Wigner state − the free particle solution of the Klein-Gordon equation − becomes objective: analogously to the nonconventionality of simultaneity proved by Malament in 1977, also in this case such an objectivity is gained via a relativization that renounces to the full Poincaré group by excluding Lorentz boosts. If invariance were a guide to objectivity in a full “Weylian” sense, however, we could not claim that particles are objectively localized, as by changing inertial frame the same state would not remain localized. This analogy with the fourth chapter, illustrating the fact that the more the invariant features, the smaller the group of symmetries and conversely, adds a unifying character to the book, while the case of the twin paradox does not seem to fall under the same case. 
The authors are not explicit about whether the choice between field theory on the one hand, and hyperplane-dependent localization of particles on the other, is fully up to us, so that it is fully conventional to choose the group of symmetries with which we want to represent the world (with or without Lorenzt boosts).  In any case, it would seem that one is not committed to saying that the choices between different invariant classes are always equally acceptable: localization relative to a hypersurface could be regarded as so weak a notion that the price of having localized particles could be higher than the gain. This judgment of course presupposes a good argument to commit oneself to the larger group of symmetry, but it may weaken the authors’ use of this case as an illustration of their general scheme.
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